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NOTES 
Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act 
In the 1970 amendments1 to the Clean Air Act (CAA),2 Congress 
introduced citizen enforcement suits into environmental statutory 
law.3 Since 1970, Congress has included such provisions in virtually 
every piece of federal environmental legislation.4 The citizen suit pro-
vision of the CAA5 has served as a model for all subsequent statutes 
authorizing environmental citizen suits. 6 However, section 505 of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA)7 differs significantly from its CAA precursor. 
1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
2. 42 u.s.c. § 7401 (1982). 
3. Citizen suit provisions in the CAA and other environmental laws authorize citizen suits 
that compel agency action in addition to citizen enforcement actions against private actors. 
While forcing courts to review agency action (or, more typically, inaction) is important, see Tim-
bers & Wirth, Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70 
CORNELL L. R.E.v. 403 (1985), this Note will consider only citizen actions that attempt to force 
private parties to comply with federal water standards. 
4. Citizen suit provisions are part of: The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2619(a)(l) (1982); the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(l)(A) (1982); the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(l) (1982); and the 
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 49ll(a)(l) (1982), among others. 
5. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(l) (1982). 
6. See Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part I. 13 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10309, 10311 (Oct. 1983) [hereinafter Miller I] ("The citizen suit sections 
of the various environmental statutes are virtually identical, being patterned closely after Clean 
Air Act § 304."); Schwartz & Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry Under the Clean 
Water Act, 17 NAT. REsOURCES LAW. 327, 328 (1984). 
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). Section 505 is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). In 1972 and 
1977, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. With the 1977 amendments, 
the name of the Act was changed to the Clean Water Act. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 
(1977). 
The basic authorization for citizen suits under the CWA at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) holds 
that: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a civil action 
on his own behalf -
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Consti-
tution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this 
chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a stan-
dard or limitation, or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to per-
form any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator. 
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or 
the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an 
order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to 
apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title. 
Section 1319(d) states that: 
Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or 
any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued 
under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator, or by a State, or in a permit issued 
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Section 505 permits citizens to sue not only for injunctive relief, but 
for civil penalties as well. 8 Courts have struggled in their efforts to 
interpret this provision, in large part because its citizen suit arrange-
ment is unique. 
One of the most difficult tasks for courts hearing suits brought 
under section 505 is determining when the statute authorizes the 
granting of citizen-requested civil penalties. Under other statutory ar-
rangements where only injunctive relief is available, citizens consider 
bringing suit only when the alleged violation is one that continues (or 
has the potential to continue9) until the time suit is brought. There is 
no need to enjoin past, noncontinuing behavior. However, when 
courts have the authority to assess civil penalties of up to $25,000 per 
day of violation, 10 citizen incentives change. Citizen enforcers who 
believe that violators should not only cease violating but be fined for 
their misconduct as well have an incentive to sue even though a pol-
luter may have permanently stopped violating. I I Citizens thus have 
under section 1344 of this title by a State, and any person who violates any order issued by 
the Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil penalty not 
to exceed $10,000 per day of such violation. 
In 1987, the CWA was amended to allow civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day of violation. See 
note 10 infra. 
8. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 1.13, at 83 (1977). 
9. Under general equity principles, injunctive relief may be appropriate even if the violation 
is not actually occurring when suit is filed. All that is necessary is that there be a realistic 
possibility that the illegal conduct will occur again. See Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal 
Pollution Control Laws, Part I/, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10063, 10075 (Feb. 1984) 
[hereinafter Miller II]. 
10. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 313, 1987 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS (101 Stat.) 7, 46-47. The 1987 amendments to the CWA increased the per day penalty 
from $10,000 to $25,000. 
11. Penalty fines imposed under the CWA are paid to the U.S. Treasury. H.R. REP. No. 911, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 133, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 820 (1973) [hereinafter 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
Nevertheless, citizen enforcers do not necessarily lose money by suing to punish polluters. The 
statute permits a successful plaintiff to recover attorney's fees. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982); see 
Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part Ill, 14 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 10407, 10407-22 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Miller III]. Although initially reluctant to 
award attorney's fees, courts are increasingly agreeing to make such awards. (However, the 
amounts of money awarded do not match those given in the antitrust or securities citizen suit 
settings, either in terms of total dollars awarded or in terms of hourly rates allowed.) In addi-
tion, there is a chance that plaintiffs who are unsuccessful or only partially successful will be 
allowed to recover attorney's fees. Miller III, supra, at 10422; see also Delaware Citizens for 
Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 62 F.R.D. 353 (D. Del. 1974), ajfd., 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 
1975) (setting forth attorney's fees standards in analogous CAA situation). Finally, if courts 
permit citizen enforcers to focus suits on past violations, the enforcers face only a very slight risk 
of losing such suits and recovering no attorney's fees. This is because most courts hearing cases 
under the CWA are quick to find statutory violations, awarding relief whenever the plaintiff can 
prove that the defendant has exceeded permit limitations. This movement goes against tradi-
tional common law rules, where deliberation regarding the possible granting of an injunction 
involved a great deal of judicial discretion. Miller II, supra note 9, at 10076; see Student Pub. 
Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers, 602 F. Supp. 1394, 1400 (D.N.J. 1985) 
("Enforcement ofNPDES permits is based on strict liability."). But see Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (claiming that the U.S. Navy, in polluting the ocean with 
bombshells from target practice, is not to be enjoined, even though it has no discharge permit, 
1658 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1656 
the power not merely to prevent the continuation of violations but also 
to promote deterrence of future violations by forcing polluters to pay 
for their past wrongs. 
The courts have not responded uniformly to the question of when 
the CWA permits a citizen to request an assessment of civil penalties 
under section 505. Some courts have argued that the statute permits 
assessment only against polluters who remain in violation at the time 
suit is brought, 12 adopting an "ongoing violation" standard. The ma-
jority of courts have held otherwise, however, either explicitly or im-
plicitly allowing suits based solely on past violations. 13 A small 
number of courts have adopted an intermediate approach, permitting 
the assessment of civil penalties for past or ongoing violations, pro-
vided the request is part of a suit in which the plaintiff also makes a 
legitimate request for injunctive relief. 14 
The resolution of this conflict has serious implications for the over-
all enforcement of the CWA. While relatively rare during the first ten 
years of the statute's existence, citizen enforcement suits under section 
505 have become increasingly common.15 In response to perceived lax 
because injunctions are issued only when "essential in order effectually to protect property rights 
against injuries otherwise irremediable"). The plaintiff's risk of losing is small because the evi· 
dence used to prove these violations comes from the polluter's discharge monitoring reports 
(DMRs), which the plaintiff can review in order to determine whether the case is winnable before 
filing suit. (DMRs are reports that list all outputs of effiuents. Every permit holder is required to 
file a DMR periodically. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2l(f), (g), 122.41(/)(4)(i) (1986).) See notes 80·83 
infra. "Most of the recent notices of intent to sue have been submitted by environmental organi· 
zations which reviewed discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) to identify noncomplying compa· 
nies." Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 327. Courts make the process of accurately 
predicting results in a DMR-based case even easier by holding that defendants in § 505 actions 
are not permitted to question the accuracy of their own monitoring reports when those reports 
are introduced in order to prove violations. Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. 
Fritzche, Dodge & Olcott, 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (D.N.J. 1984). 
12. See Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co., 817 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1987); Hamker v. Diamond 
Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985); Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy 
Corp., 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1390 (D.R.I. 1984). 
13. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 24 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1993 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. 
Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. Mon-
santo Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474 (D.N.J. 1985); Sierra Club v. Raytheon Co., 22 Envt. Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1050 (D. Mass. 1984). 
14. See Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986). 
Although the First Circuit was the first court of appeals to adopt an intermediate standard, such 
an approach was previously supported by other lower courts. See Hamker v. Diamond Sham-
rock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 1985) (Williams, J., concurring); Sierra Club v. 
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 22 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Friends of the Earth v. 
Facet Enter., 618 F. Supp. 532, 535 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (allegation of an ongoing violation does 
not mean polluter must be violating the statute on the day suit is filed); Sierra Club v. Tosco 
Corp., 22 Envt. Rep. Cas (BNA) 2117, 2118 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (ongoing violation does not require 
"technical violation at the instant that the complaint is filed"). 
15. For the years 1978-1982, 41 notices of suit and actual suits were reported. In 1983 alone, 
this number jumped to 108. In the first three months of 1984 the increase continued, with 87 
notices and suits being recorded. Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 34 (1985). See Polebaum & Slater, Preclusion of Citizen Environ-
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enforcement by the EPA under the Reagan Administration, 16 environ-
mental groups are relying more and more heavily on section 505 citi-
zen suits. 17 The availability of civil penalties undeniably affects both 
the type of relief requested and the timing of the suits. The impor-
tance of this issue has led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. 18 
The decision in Chesapeake will resolve disputes over the proper inter-
pretation of the civil penalty portion of section 505. This Note exam-
ines the various arguments made in support of each interpretation of 
section 505 and suggests that the appropriate standard closely resem-
bles that proposed by the First Circuit. This approach permits the 
assessment of civil penalties when the request for penalties is accompa-
nied by a reasonable request for injunctive relief. 
Part I briefly describes the division that currently exists between 
the Fourth, Fifth, and First Circuits. Part II analyzes the arguments 
relating to statutory construction, focusing on statutory language and 
structure as illuminated by legislative history. Part III examines the 
broader policy considerations arising when courts decide questions of 
citizen suit jurisdiction under section 505. Resolution of this issue has 
usually entailed an extreme interpretation of section 505, either very 
rarely allowing suits for past violations or allowing them in all cases.19 
mental Enforcement Litigation by Agency Action, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10013 (Jan. 
1986); "Citizen Suits" Become a Popular Weapon Against Industrial Polluters, Wall St. J., Apr. 
17, 1987, at 11, col. 4. 
16. Miller III, supra note 11, at 10424. 
17. See note 15 supra. While individual citizens are allowed to bring suits on their own 
behalf, in practice the great majority of citizen suits under the CWA are brought by national 
environmental groups. "Such groups are primarily responsible for the explosion of citizen suits 
under the Clean Water Act." Fadil, supra note 15, at 31. See also Schwartz & Hackett, supra 
note 6, at 327. 
While § 505 nowhere mentions suits by environmental groups on behalf of their members, it 
is clear that Congress intended to permit such suits because § 505 consciously incorporates the 
standing requirements set forth in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Senate Consider-
ation of the Report of the Conference Committee, Oct. 4, 1972, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 11, at 221. According to this standard, an environmental group may bring 
suit when the group alleges an injury to a cognizable interest that affects the group itself, or any 
individual members of the group. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734-35; Fadil, supra note 15, at 39-40; 
Miller I, supra note 6, at 10309 ("[T]he general or even particular interest of an organization in a 
pollution problem will not give it standing, but allegations that its members are injured will."). 
18. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 
1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987). 
19. When discussing civil penalties under the CWA, analysts typically argue either that all 
suits should be prohibited in the absence of an ongoing violation, or that such suits should be 
permitted when based on any violation, whether past, intermittent, or continuing. See generally 
Roisman, The Role of the Citizen in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10163 (July 1986) (stressing the deterrent effect of civil penalties by contrasting an "ongo-
ing violation" system with only one alternative, a system permitting any past violation to work as 
a basis for suit); Connecticut Fund for the Envt. v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 213 (D. 
Conn. 1985) (inquiry limited to the "ongoing violation" and "any past violation" standards, even 
though the defendant's history of 174 permit violations could have supported a compromise 
standard permitting suit on grounds plaintiff had reason to believe violations were ongoing). But 
see note 14 supra. 
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Parts II and III argue that the most appropriate response to this prob-
lem is actually the less frequently adopted "reasonableness" standard 
approved by the First Circuit. This intermediate standard would best 
achieve the two principal goals of the CWA- compelling polluters to 
comply with appropriate effluent standards and deterring potential fu-
ture violators - and would significantly improve enforcement under 
the statute. 
I. THE CURRENT CONFLICT: THE "ONGOING VIOLATION," "ANY 
PAST VIOLATION," AND "REASONABLE BELIEF" 
STANDARDS 
In 1985, with Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 20 the 
Fifth Circuit became the first court of appeals to interpret expressly 
section 505.21 In Hamker, citizen-plaintiffs brought suit seeking in-
junctive relief and civil penalties under section 505, and damages 
under state law on a theory of negligence. 22 Additionally, the plain-
tiffs claimed an implied private right of action under section 505 and 
sought damages for injuries caused by the continuing effects of a one-
time past oil leak from a Diamond Shamrock pipeline. The court af-
firmed a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that 
citizen suits under section 505 are authorized only where plaintiffs al-
lege a current, ongoing violation of an effluent standard, limitation, or 
order, and that the section authorizes only civil penalties and injunc-
tive relief, not private damages.23 
20. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit adhered to the Hamker approach in 
Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co., 817 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1987). 
21. One court of appeals had touched on this issue in dicta. The Seventh Circuit, in City of 
Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir. 1979), suggested that 
such suits were only allowable for prospective relief. Even this suggestion, however, was called 
into question by the Seventh Circuit's later decision in Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 
F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982). 
22. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 393. 
23. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396. Significantly, many of the cases in which courts adopted this 
"ongoing violation" approach have involved plaintiffs seeking private damages by including 
either appended state-law damages claims or implied causes of action under federal common law. 
See Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d at 1008; Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy 
Corp., 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1390 (D.R.I. 1984) (before a magistrate); Philadelphia v. Ste-
pan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Penn. 1982). The framers of the 1972 amendments 
envisioned that all civil penalties from actions would be paid into the U.S. Treasury. The expla-
nation of the provision presented before the Senate expressed the belief that all awards were to be 
"deposited as miscellaneous receipts and not ... recovered by the complainant." S. REP. No. 
414, 92d Cong, 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLU· 
TION CoNTROL Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1497 (1973) [hereinafter 2 A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY]. Faced with claims for damages brought under a federal statute that provides only for 
injunctive relief and civil penalties, courts have found further reason to reject subject matter 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, many courts adopting the ongoing violation approach have not lim-
ited their holdings to cases involving private damages claims, thus creating an unduly restrictive 
standard. This failure to place limits on the reach of the decisions has led other courts to agree 
with the results while disagreeing with the standard adopted. The First Circuit in Pawtuxet 
Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), remarked upon this prob-
lem, agreeing with the decisions in Hamker and the lower court in Pawtuxet, 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. 
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Shortly after the decision in Hamker, the Fourth Circuit decided 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 24 re-
quiring an interpretation of the citizen suit provision of the CWA. The 
facts in Chesapeake were significantly different from those in Hamker. 
The Chesapeake plaintiffs did not seek to recover damages themselves, 
but merely to enjoin the defendant from violating relevant effiuent 
standards and to force the defendant to pay civil penalties for previous 
violations.25 In Chesapeake, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the 
Fifth Circuit's approach26 and held that civil penalties are assessable 
even if based solely on past violations.27 By adopting this "any past 
violation" standard, the Fourth Circuit legitimized the approach taken 
by a majority of district courts28 and created a clear division among 
the circuits. 
While the Hamker and Chesapeake approaches represent the two 
most common interpretations of section 505, the First Circuit rejected 
both in Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 29 The court 
opted for a new third standard, although the factual setting of the case 
had led the district court to declare citizen requested civil penalties 
assessable only when the violation is continuing. 30 The plaintiffs in 
Pawtuxet alleged injury due to the release of untreated wastewater by 
Ciba-Geigy Corp., owner of an upstream chemical manufacturing 
plant. Because the defendant was not releasing effiuents in violation of 
its discharge permit at the time suit was brought, the district court 
(BNA) 1393 (D.R.I. 1984), but suggesting that the reasoning leading to the decisions was faulty. 
InHamker, one of the three judges, Judge Williams, agreed with the result reached by the major-
ity but wrote a separate concurring opinion suggesting that the decision should be restricted to its 
facts, thereby leaving room to penalize a chronic or episodic violator who might not be violating 
at the time suit is filed. Hamker, 156 F.2d at 399 (Williams, J., concurring). 
24. 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987). 
2S. Chesapeake, 791 F.2d at 306. This fact situation is more typical of the majority of suits 
brought under § SOS. Unlike the suits brought by the Hamker plaintiffs, most suits do not in-
volve attempts to recover private damages. See, e.g., Connecticut Fund for the Envt. v. Job 
Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 198S); Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 22 Envt. 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1342 (N.D. Cal. 198S); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enter., 618 F. Supp. S32 
(W.D.N.Y. 1984). But cf. Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 
617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 198S) (plaintiff sued for civil penalties without requesting injunctive 
relief). 
26. Chesapeake, 791 F.2d at 309, 312-13. As well as refusing to follow Hamker's lead, the 
Chesapeake court also considered but rejected a compromise standard suggested, in amicus cu-
riae, by the federal government. 791 F.2d at 308 n.9. 
27. Chesapeake, 791 F.2d at 313 ("citizen suits like the one at bar, seeking civil penalties for 
permit violations committed entirely in the past, are permitted under section SOS(a)"). 
28. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 63S F. Supp 284 
(N.D.N.Y. 1986); Connecticut Fund for the Envt. v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 
198S); Student Pub. Interest Res. Group ofN.J., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 61S F. Supp. 1419 
(D.N.J. 198S); Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 
1474 (D.N.J. 198S); Sierra Club v. Aluminum Co. of Am., S8S F. Supp. 842 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
29. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986). 
30. Pawtuxet, 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1393 (D.R.!. 1984). 
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dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under section 505.31 The court of 
appeals upheld dismissal of the suit, but declined to affirm the district 
court's interpretation of section 505. Rather, the court of appeals 
opted for a standard under which a citizen may sue for civil penalties 
when the request for penalties is part of a reasonable request for in-
junctive relief. 32 So long as the plaintiff in good faith believes that the 
defendant poses a threat to violate again, the request for relief is rea-
sonable and jurisdiction should be authorized. 33 
The courts of appeals have thus proposed three very different ap-
proaches for the determination of when to allow citizens to sue for 
civil penalties under the CWA. Detailed examinations of the language 
of section 505, the provision's role in the CWA as a whole, and the 
ramifications of each approach suggest that the First Circuit's ap-
proach is the most appropriate. 
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. The Language of Section 505 
The starting point for interpreting any provision must be the lan-
guage of the provision. 34 Section 505 provides that suits may be 
31. Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v Ciba-Geigy Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20685 (D.R.I. May 17, 1984). 
32. Under this standard, a citizen-plaintiff is permitted to go forward with an action under 
§ 505 "[i]f a defendant's history of past violations is such that it is reasonable to believe that 
misconduct will continue." Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094. Once jurisdiction is authorized on the 
basis of the reasonableness of the citizen-plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, the plaintiff "may 
recover a (civil] penalty judgment for past violations even if the injunction proves unobtainable." 
807 F.2d at 1094 (emphasis added). The court affirmed dismissal in Pawtuxet because at the time 
suit was brought the defendant was no longer operating under the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit it had allegedly violated. Therefore, the plaintiffs could not 
allege a reasonable likelihood of further violation. 807 F.2d at 1094. 
33. This intermediate standard may be framed as a good faith standard, see Chesapeake Bay 
Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 308 n.9 (4th Cir. 1986), a reasonable 
belief standard, see Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 22 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1342 (N.D. 
Cal. 1985); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enter., 618 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (pattern of 
intermittent violations permits a reasonable inference of ongoing misconduct), or a mootness 
standard, see Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 349. In the great majority of cases, the 
identical result will be reached under any of these formulations. The Pawtuxet court itself points 
to the interchangeability of these standards by referring at one point to a situation in which "it is 
reasonable to believe" past wrongs will be repeated, while later suggesting that the standard 
hinges upon whether the plaintiff "makes allegations warranting injunctive relief in good faith, 
judged objectively." Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094. Under a mootness test, an action for civil 
penalties would be allowed provided the prerequisite prayer for injunctive relief were not moot. 
Common law principles hold that, generally, a request for injunctive relief is moot only where 
there is no possible reason to believe that the violation will recur. See, e.g., United States v. 
Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199 (1968); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 
345 U.S. 629 (1953). See generally Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 349. Such a standard is 
capable of functioning effectively in the environmental arena. At least one court has already 
applied a mootness test to requests for injunctions under the Clean Air Act. Gardeski v. Colo-
nial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (request for injunctive relief not moot 
so long as defendant company is legally entitled to resume plant operations). 
34. See Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1985); Chesa-
peake, 791 F.2d at 308. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the starting point for 
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brought against any person "alleged to be in violation" of statutory or 
regulatory limitations.35 Use of the present tense in the citizen suit 
provision seems to support an ongoing violation standard by implying 
that only the defendant's present conduct determines liability. The 
Fifth Circuit in Hamker and the District of Rhode Island in Paw-
tuxet36 both placed great weight on the language in subsection 505(a), 
asserting that Congress clearly and unambiguously intended to permit 
suits only against those literally "in violation" at the time suit is 
brought. 37 Because some courts have held that the language of this 
provision is determinative, they have found no need to rely on further 
statutory analysis or on broader policy considerations for support of 
the "ongoing violation" standard.38 
Despite assertions that subsection (a) is unambiguous, its language 
may be read to support a standard that is based on the reasonableness 
of the plaintiff's request for enforcement of effiuent standards. The 
First Circuit, for example, construed the phrase "is alleged to be in 
violation" so as to complement the injunctive thrust of subsection 
505(a).39 The court held that citizen suits may be allowed where the 
plaintiff "fairly alleges a continuing likelihood that the defendant, if 
not enjoined, will again proceed to violate the [CWA]."40 
The language of subsection 505(g) further supports the reasonable-
ness approach. In this provision, Congress defines "citizen" for pur-
poses of the statute as a "person or persons having an interest which is 
or may be adversely affected."41 This language indicates that Congress 
intended to authorize citizen suits where the plaintiff is currently suf-
fering injury or where there is a chance that the plaintiff's interests 
will be adversely affected. There is no mention of suits for the protec-
tion of interests that "have been" adversely affected, or a limitation 
determination of congressional intent is the statutory language. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 
U.S. 259, 265-66 (1981); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). 
36. 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1393. 
37. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395; Pawtuxet, 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1392. Cf Pawtuxet, 
807 F.2d at 1089; Hamker, 756 F.2d at 399 (Williams, J., concurring). 
38. See Pawtuxet, 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1393. 
39. Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1093. 
40. 807 F.2d at 1094. Noting that "this is precisely the showing that would induce a court to 
issue an injunction," 807 F.2d at 1094, the First Circuit analogized this test to the standard 
regularly applied to the $10,000 requirement for diversity jurisdiction, where a good faith allega-
tion is generally sufficient to preserve jurisdiction even if the amount at issue turns out to be less. 
807 F.2d at 1093; see also Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 
304, 308 n.9 (4th Cir. 1986); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). Under both the diversity jurisdiction and 
proposed reasonableness standards, so long as the allegation enabling the court to take jurisdic-
tion is reasonable, the court retains jurisdiction for the entire case regardless of eventual 
outcome. 
41. 33 u.s.c. § 1365(g) (1982). 
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restricting suits only to those on behalf of interests currently being 
harmed. 
It is evident, however, that the language of section 505 is actually 
capable of supporting multiple justifiable interpretations.42 The pres-
ent-tense language in subsection 505(a) is similar to that employed in 
sections authorizing government enforcement, 43 and no court has 
held that the government is limited to enforcement of ongoing viola-
tions. 44 Use of the present tense does not necessarily mean that only 
ongoing violations may be the subject of penalty suits. Additionally, 
one who violated in the past plausibly remains "in violation" in the 
present. 45 The language of section 505 therefore is not self-explana-
tory, and more than the language itself must be examined. 46 
B. Statutory Structure, Legislative History, and the Need for a 
Distinction Between Government and Citizen 
Enforcement Actions 
Although the court in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical 
Co. holds the language of section 505 to be unambiguous, the court 
also finds evidence in the statute as a whole to strengthen its interpre-
tation. In support of its ongoing violation theory, Hamker places 
great reliance on the notice provision contained in subsection 
505(b)(l)(A),47 which requires a potential citizen-plaintiff, whether 
42. If nothing else suggested an ambiguity, the mere fact that so many courts adopted the 
"any past violation" standard before any court had set forth the ongoing violation theory, see, 
e.g., Sierra Club v. Aluminum Co. of America, 585 F. Supp. 842, (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Sierra Club 
v. Raytheon Co., 22 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1050 (D. Mass. 1984); Menzel v. County Util. 
Corp., 712 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1983), suggests that the phrasing is more ambiguous than the 
Hamker and initial Pawtuxet decisions indicate. Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. 
v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 119S (D.N.J. 1985). 
43. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(l), 1319(a)(3) (1982). These sections provide for govern· 
mental enforcement against those alleged to be "in violation of" limitations, standards, or orders. 
44. See Student Pub. Interest Res. Group ofN.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474 
(D.N.J. 1985); United States v. Earth Science, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979); United States 
v. Detrex Chem. Indus., 393 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Ohio 1975); see also note SS infra. 
45. The district court in the Chesapeake case, Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., v. Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1547 (E.D. Va. 198S), drew analogy to tax deficiencies, 
where a taxpayer who failed to pay taxes in 1982 but did pay in 1983 and 1984 is still "in 
violation" in 1985. But see Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1092 (finding "the argument forced, and the 
[taxpayer] analogy inapt" because a "ceased improper discharge does not 'continue' " and the 
statute does not "speak in terms of 'taint' "). 
46. Where the statutory language is ambiguous, the Court will examine other indicia of con-
gressional intent, such as the statutory scheme and legislative history. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 
462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
47. 756 F.2d at 395-96. The notice provision of§ 50S(b) states: 
No action may be commenced -
(1) under subsection (a)(l) of this section -
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to 
the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any 
alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or 
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or 
criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the 
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contemplating a suit for injunctive relief or for civil penalties, to pro-
vide the federal government, the state, and the defendant with sixty 
days notice before filing suit.48 
While portions of the Hamker court's analysis of the notice provi-
sion may be persuasive, 49 the court's guiding interpretation rests upon 
a mistaken premise. The court assumes that the primary purpose of 
the notice provision is to provide an offender with a sixty-day grace 
period for complying with applicable standards and thus avoiding lia-
bility. 50 This interpretation is not supported by either the structure or 
the purpose of the CWA. Such a reading completely eliminates the 
punitive aspects of the statute,51 by which compliance is induced 
under threat of civil penalties. Hamker leaves injunctive relief as the 
only means for citizens to compel compliance. 52 Further, an intent to 
create what amounts to an escape mechanism appears nowhere in the 
legislative history, where Congress speaks of including the notice pro-
vision primarily to induce governmental action.53 Finally, the 
Hamker interpretation makes part of the statute meaningless. If the 
notice period is designed to give the violator time to come into compli-
ance and avoid liability, there is no reason for a provision requiring 
standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United States any 
citizen may intervene as a matter of right. 
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given 
notice of such action to the Administrator, 
except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an 
action under this section respecting a violation of sections 1316 and 13 l 7(a) of this title. 
Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall pre-
scribe by regulation. 
33 u.s.c. § 1365(b) (1982). 
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (1982). 
49. See notes 61-62 infra and accompanying text. 
50. "[I]t is most reasonable to read the requirement that notice also be given to the alleged 
violator as an indication that where the violator responds to the notice by bringing himself into 
compliance, the citizen loses the right to bring suit under 1365(a) .... " Hamker, 756 F.2d at 
396. 
51. While it is true that Congress clearly intended the provision to work primarily as a means 
of inducing compliance, see note 74 infra and accompanying text, Congress would not have 
included the civil penalty authorization at all if it were not to have some effect as a deterrence 
mechanism. Enabling a defendant to avoid liability so easily by simply "turning off the spigot" 
makes the civil penalty aspect of the statute almost meaningless. See notes 86-88 infra and ac-
companying text. 
52. See Fadil, supra note 15, at 80-81. 
53. Suits for past violations, "actual or threatened - may serve to prod public authorities 
into enforcing environmental laws with increased zeal. ... [This justification] arose repeatedly in 
congressional debates on the merits of citizen suit provisions." Fadil, supra note 15, at 24; Note, 
Statute of Limitations for Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 195, 
201 (1986). See s. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 436-39 (1974); see Miller I, supra 
note 6, at 10311 ("[C]itizens were allowed to sue, but could do so only after notifying appropriate 
regulatory agencies and giving them [the] opportunity to sue first."); Schwartz & Hackett, supra 
note 6, at 343; W. RODGERS, supra note 8, § 1.13; Village of Kaktovik v. Corps of Engineers, 12 
Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1740, 1744 (D. Alaska 1978) (notice provision included in order "to 
encourage agencies to enforce relevant standards"). 
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government enforcers also to give advance notice.54 Because the fed-
eral government unquestionably is permitted to sue for past viola-
tions, 55 the thirty-day period between notification of suit and the 
commencement of a government enforcement action cannot be 
designed to give the violator time to comply and avoid the need for a 
suit. The system mandating that citizen enforcers give governmental 
enforcers and defendants sixty days notice, while governmental en-
forcers must give defendants thirty days notice, makes sense only if the 
notice provisions serve two purposes: in the case of citizen suits, stim-
ulating governmental enforcement; and, in the case of suits by the fed-
eral government, providing both an extra period for the defendant to 
gather evidence and time for the state to intervene and take charge of 
enforcement. 56 
The notice provision tpus does not support the ongoing violation 
theory in the manner suggested by the Hamker court. At the same 
time, arguments similar to those used in rejecting the Hamker ap-
proach indicate that the notice provision also does not support the 
broader Chesapeake standard that permits citizens to sue for civil pen-
alties based on any past violation. While the Hamker interpretation 
improperly restricts citizens by limiting them to injunctive actions, the 
Chesapeake approach goes too far in the opposite direction. Under an 
"any past violation" standard, citizens are allowed to become the pri-
mary enforcers of the CWA, with enforcement powers equal to those 
granted governmental enforcers. The overall structure and purposes 
of the CWA, as well as its legislative history, clearly indicate that such 
a role is inappropriate for citizen enforcers. 
The legislative history relating to the notice provision suggests that 
Congress included this provision primarily as a means of spurring gov-
54. The EPA Administrator is required to notify both the violator and the State. If within 30 
days the State has not taken an appropriate enforcement action, the Administrator may bring 
suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(l) (1982). 
55. The EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement stressed the fact that the governmen-
tal enforcement strategy set forth "applies to past and future violations of the ... requirements of 
the Clean Air and Water Acts." EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, EPA Civil Pen-
alty Policy for Major Source Violators of Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, 8 Envt. Rep. (BNA) 
2011, 2013 (Apr. 11, 1978) [hereinafter EPA Policy Memorandum]. See Chesapeake, 791 F.2d 
at 309; note 44 supra and accompanying text. 
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(l) (1982) allows the federal government to notify the appropriate 
state when a violation is suspected. Once a state is notified, the Administrator is permitted to 
bring suit "[i]f beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's notification the State has not 
commenced appropriate enforcement action." Interestingly, no provision in the CWA explicitly 
grants to states the power to bring enforcement actions against violators. Because enforcement 
actions brought in state court are given preclusive effect under§ 505(b)(l)(B), however, the stat-
ute accommodates state-law claims that reach beyond the scope of the federal statute. Addition-
ally, states that are adversely affected by violations in neighboring states may indirectly bring an 
enforcement action by commencing a civil action against the Administrator for failing to enforce 
effluent standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1982). Finally, at least one court has held that a state 
may qualify as a citizen under § 505(g) capable of bringing citizen suits under § 505(a). Massa-
chusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976). But see California v. 
Department of the Navy, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20618 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1986). 
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ernmental action. 57 The citizen enforcer is required to give the federal 
and state governments sixty days notice before filing suit so that either 
government has the opportunity to take over the enforcement action if 
it so chooses. 58 Government control of litigation initiated by citizen 
enforcers is authorized by the preemption provision in subsection 
505(b)(l)(B), according to which no citizen is permitted to bring suit, 
either for penalties or for injunctive relief, if a state or federal enforce-
ment agency is diligently pursuing compliance in a court of law.59 
Taken together, the notice provision, the federal preemption provi-
sion, and the congressional preference for agency enforcement make 
clear that governments are intended to be the primary enforcers of the 
CWA's standards, limitations, and regulations. 60 The Hamker court 
quite logically argues that all of these factors establishing the primacy 
of governmental enforcement suggest that there must be a distinction 
between citizen and agency enforcement powers. 61 Because Congress 
so clearly designated federal and state agencies as the desired enforcers 
of the CWA's requirements, powers granted to citizens should supple-
ment, but not duplicate or exceed, those granted to governmental en-
forcers. 62 To have granted equal enforcement powers would have 
57. See Statements of Sen. Muskie, Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference 
Committee, Oct. 4, 1972, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 179; s. REP. 
No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79, 80 (1971), reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
23, at 1497-98 (notice provisions added "[i]n order to further encourage and provide for agency 
enforcement .... The time between notice and filing of the action should give the administrative 
enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged violation."). See note 53 supra and ac-
companying text. 
58. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982). 
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982) provides in relevant part: 
No action may be commenced -
(1) under subsection (a)(l) of this section -
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or 
criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the 
standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United States any 
citizen may intervene as a matter of right. 
Courts disagree over the issue of which government enforcement actions are given preclusive 
effect. See generally notes 104-10 infra. 
Congress arguably may have included this subsection to ensure that citizens and agencies 
would not pursue identical enforcement actions simultaneously. If this were the sole purpose, 
however, primary enforcement capability would have been granted to the first party to bring suit, 
not exclusively to the government. The constant emphasis on prodding government enforcers 
suggests that Congress thought governmental enforcement preferable. This preference is ex-
pressed in the Conference Report on Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: 
"If the Administrator or a State begins a civil or criminal action on its own against an alleged 
polluter, no court action [can] take place on the citizen's suit." S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 145, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 328. 
60. See Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395. See generally Polebaum & Slater, supra note 15, at 10013. 
61. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395. 
62. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396 ("The requirement that notice be given to the responsible offi-
cials highlights their primary role in enforcing the Act compared to the supplementary positicin 
of the citizen .... "). But see Connecticut Fund for the Envt. v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 
207, 213 (D. Conn. 1985) ("the remedies obtainable in citizen suits should be coextensive with 
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greatly diminished the importance of agency enforcers in the scheme 
of enforcement. Because the Chesapeake "any past violation" stan-
dard works to eliminate the differences in government and citizen en-
forcement powers, the standard does not comport well with the 
structure of the CWA. 
The appropriate standard must preserve the distinction between 
citizen and government enforcers while preventing the defendant from 
avoiding liability during the sixty-day notification period. A reasona-
bleness standard accomplishes both objectives. By limiting a citizen-
plaintiff's ability to receive an award of civil penalties to situations 
where it is reasonable to believe the defendant may pollute again, 63 the 
reasonableness standard gives the government superior enforcement 
capabilities. Agencies are always able to sue for civil penalties, while 
citizens may only do so when the fear of future violations appears to 
be well-founded. The reasonableness approach thus preserves the pri-
macy of agency enforcement. 
Additionally, the reasonableness standard does not permit the de-
fendant to avoid liability merely by ceasing the violative behavior upon 
receiving notification of suit. Under the ongoing violation standard, 
no civil penalties can be awarded if a violator stops polluting just 
before suit is brought and the government chooses not to enforce. 64 
With the Pawtuxet-type reasonableness standard, a citizen-plaintiff 
may still be able to succeed in pursuing a penalty award if there is 
reason to believe the polluter may violate again. The standard thus 
prevents the violator from escaping liability by temporarily halting im-
proper discharges, but nevertheless preserves a meaningful difference 
between citizen and government enforcement powers. 
Significant portions of the legislative history accompanying section 
505 suggest that Congress intended a reasonableness standard to ap-
ply. Although the record of congressional consideration contains few 
those available in suits initiated by the federal government"); Student Pub. Interest Res. Group 
ofN.J., Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1198-99 (D.N.J. 1985); Fadil, supra note 15, 
at 80 (arguing for an "any past violation" standard in order to "reduce the present disparity in 
enforcement authority between private and public enforcers"). 
Courts and commentators that call for equalization of enforcement powers consistently argue 
that putting citizens and governmental enforcers on equal footing will increase the ability of 
citizens effectively to enforce the CWA. If citizen suits for civil penalties do have a substantial 
deterrent effect, this assertion probably has some validity. However, there are undoubtedly many 
techniques that, if adopted, would improve enforcement and lead to increased compliance -
allowing the government completely to shut down all violators, for example, would have a sub-
stantial tremendous deterrent effect. The goal in interpreting this provision is not to devise the 
most effective enforcement system imaginable, but to implement the system that Congress cre-
ated, in the way that Congress intended. To do this, the distinction between agency and citizen 
enforcers must be preserved. 
63. See Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094; Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enters., 618 F. Supp. 532, 
535 n.l (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 
64. It must be remembered that a defendant's ability to escape citizen suit liability under any 
standard is only meaningful if the Administrator, who may always sue for past violations, 
chooses not to bring suit. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text. 
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specific references to section 505, 65 it is nevertheless possible to deter-
mine the intent of Congress with respect to the workings of the citizen 
suit provision. 66 In the course of Senate consideration of the provi-
sion, Senator Muskie, the sponsor of the measure, suggested that a 
citizen is not limited to injunctive relief, but may bring a penalty suit 
against "any person who is alleged to be, or to have been, in violation, 
whether the violation be a continuous one, or an occasional or spo-
radic one. " 67 
While Senator Muskie's remarks indicate that a violation need not 
be continuing on the very day suit is filed for a civil penalty action to 
be authorized, thus clearly rejecting an ongoing violation standard, his 
statement may also rule out the Chesapeake interpretation, since not 
all past violations will be "occasional or sporadic."68 The critical dis-
tinction between "past" violations and "sporadic" violations suggests 
an intention to permit suits only where such a suit might work to pre-
vent further unlawful discharges. If, for example, a source has a his-
tory of polluting only during a particular season (a sporadic 
65. Commentators have been troubled by this shortage of pertinent congressional discussion. 
See, e.g., Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 331 (noting that the addition of civil penalties is a 
major change from the CAA, but claiming that the "legislative history does not discuss the 
reasons for that change"); Miller I, supra note 6, at 10319. 
66. The legislative history surrounding the adoption of the citizen suit provision of the CAA, 
§ 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982), would ordinarily provide adequate guidance for the interpreta-
tion of subsequent citizen suit provisions. See Miller I, supra note 6, at 10311 ("There are per-
haps no sections of the environmental statutes where precedent under one statute so clearly 
applies to others."); Riesel, Environmental Suits by Citizens, 8 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERI-
AIS J. 53 (1983) ("[C]ourts have freely cited the legislative history of the Clean Air Act ... when 
interpreting subsequently enacted environmental legislation providing for the commencement of 
citizen suits."). While there are important similarities between the citizen suit provisions of the 
CWA and the CAA, see H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1972), reprinted in 1 A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 820; Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 328, the 
legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 7604 is of limited use when considering the major difference 
between the two authorizations of citizen action: the CWA allows citizens to sue for civil penal-
ties, while the CAA does not. See H.R. REP No. 911, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 131, reprinted in 1 A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 820. 
67. 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 179 (statement of Sen. Muskie). Courts 
adopting both the reasonableness and "any past violation" standards have placed great emphasis 
on Sen. Muskie's statement. See Chesapeake, 791 F.2d at 311-12; Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094; 
Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 
(D.N.J. 1985); Chesapeake, 611 F. Supp. at 1548. The emphasis is well placed. Since Sen. Mus-
kie was the sponsor and the most outspoken advocate of the 1972 amendments, it was his under-
standing of the measure that was most frequently relied on and his interpretations that were 
usually adopted. According to Sen. Muskie, "a citizen has a right under section 505 to bring an 
action for an appropriate remedy i,n the case of any person who is alleged to be, or to have been, 
in violation, whether the violation be a continuous one, or an occasional or sporadic one." 1 A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 179 (statement of Sen. Muskie). 
68. The district court in Chesapeake found support for an "any past violation" interpretation 
of § 505 from omissions in the congressional deliberations. Looking at committee discussions of 
the civil penalties provision, the court could find nothing indicating a congressional intent to 
limit the use of civil penalties to ongoing violations, thereby inferring that such a limitation was 
not envisioned as part of the statute. 611 F. Supp. at 1548 ("[T]he absence of any discussion of 
such a requirement - in the context of acknowledging the general availability of civil penalties 
- implies that such a requirement was never contemplated."). 
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polluter), 69 a suit for civil penalties may be brought at any time, not 
just during a seasonal discharge. On the other hand, a citizen could 
not bring suit against a company that discharged pollutants one time 
in the past, 70 unless the discharge was part of an intermittent or spo-
radic pattern. 71 
There is further evidence in the legislative history suggesting that 
Congress intended such a fine distinction. First, the relationship be-
tween the CWA and the CAA argues against an overly broad stan-
dard. While the civil penalty authorization distinguishes the CWA 
from the CAA, congressional discussions nonetheless indicate that the 
citizen suit provision of section 505 was explicitly modeled on section 
304 of the CAA. 72 The addition of civil penalty requests was intended 
merely to be a modification of the CAA's citizen suit provision. 73 Sec-
tion 304 of the CAA only authorizes injunctive relief. It would have 
been a radical departure from, not simply a modification of, this citi-
zen suit scheme had Congress authorized suits for civil penalties under 
the CWA in situations where no legitimate request for injunctive relief 
is possible. 
Congress further stressed the importance of injunctive actions by 
focusing almost entirely on inducing compliance. Congressional re-
69. For example, in Chesapeake, the defendant corporation had exceeded its permit limita-
tions numerous times during the winter prior to the suit. It was unclear, however, whether the 
defendant's newly implemented procedure would stop this pattern of violation. 791 F.2d at 308. 
70. One-time violations often occur when firms must struggle to bring their systems into 
compliance with new effluent standards. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Spe· 
cialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Sierra Club v. Raytheon Co., 22 Envt. 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1050 (D. Mass. 1984). Similarly, there may be no reasonable grounds for 
injunctive relief where a violator has shut down operations or sold its facilities, see Friends of the 
Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 24 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1993 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), or 
where the defendant has received a new permit that increases allowable levels of discharge, see, 
e.g., Menzel v. County Util. Corp., 712 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1983). 
71. Application of the Pawtuxet reasonableness standard would not radically alter judicial 
authorization of citizen suits. Had the Hamker and Chesapeake courts applied a reasonableness 
test, for example, the outcomes of the cases would not have been different. In Hamker, a request 
for injunctive relief for a one-time, past oil leak would have been held unreasonable and the suit 
for civil penalties dismissed. In Chesapeake, the violations were seasonal and thus provided rea-
sonable grounds for issuing an injunction, thereby triggering the possibility of a civil penalties 
judgment under the Pawtuxet rule. 
A few notable decisions would have been decided differently under Pawtuxet. Cf. Atlantic 
States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); 
Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 24 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1993 (N.D.N.Y. 
1986) (facility's previous owner held liable for violations occurring after facility sold); AT&T Bell 
Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985) (defendant had begun using a nonpolluting sewage treat-
ment facility); Menzel v. County Util. Corp., 712 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1983) (violations occurred 
before NPDES permit received and defendant never violated permit once received). 
72. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975); S. 
REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 
1497; Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 348-49 (noting that both statutes use identical phrase 
"in violation of" to authorize citizen suits). 
73. s. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 23, at 1497. See Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094. 
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ports consistently suggested that the primary purpose behind citizens 
suits was the abatement of "ongoing" violations, 74 not the deterrence 
of future violations through penalty assessments. Permitting citizen-
enforced civil penalties for past violations avoids this emphasis on 
abatement-minded injunctive relief and introduces a new twist - in-
ducing compliance by forcing the violator, before polluting, to con-
sider the threat of quasi-punitive,75 economic sanctions.76 By 
including civil penalties in a citizen's legal arsenal, Congress must 
have intended to make the citizen suit provision effective as a deterrent 
in limited situations. 77 However, allowing citizens to focus exclusively 
on the penalization of individual polluters while ignoring the primary 
role of citizen-plaintiffs as protectors against future harm contradicts 
the statute's overriding emphasis on injunctive relief. 78 
74. In discussing attorney's fees, a Senate report stated that attorney's fees should be recover-
able by a plaintiff whose suit results in abatement before reaching a verdict. S. REP. No. 414, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 1499. Underlying 
this statement, and the rest of the congressional deliberations, is the belief that the only proper 
reason for a citizen to bring a suit is to induce compliance. The First Circuit in Pawtuxet stated 
that support for its interpretation "may be found in congressional references to citizen suit provi-
sions as a means of 'abating' ongoing violations of the Act." Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1093 n.2 
(citing s. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79-82, reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 23, at 1497-500). Clearly citizen suits are designed to give citizens the capability to 
force defendants into compliance. 
75. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's treatment of "civil penalties" as distinguished 
from criminal penalties under Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1938), the purpose 
served by the assessment of civil penalties in the CWA is essentially punitive. Traditionally, civil 
penalties were remedial; however, penalties that are payable to the U.S. Treasury are not merely 
remedial. Rather, the goals of civil penalties under the CWA are deterrence and penalization -
goals normally asserted in connection with criminal sanctions. Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, 
Thoughts on the Role of Penalties in the Enforcement of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 
DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1978-1979); see text at notes 111-16 infra (questioning the assumption that civil 
penalties redress injuries suffered by plaintiffs who are not also suing for injunctive relief). 
76. See EPA Policy Memorandum, supra note 55, at 2012 (suggesting that civil penalties 
induce compliance and deter violations by forcing defendants to consider potential economic 
losses); Reisman, supra note 19, at 10163. 
77. Few argue with the notion that by including an authorization for civil penalties Congress 
hoped to introduce a citizen-triggered deterrence mechanism. One analyst has argued, however, 
that allowing suits for past violations will actually weaken this deterrent effect. Garret, Citizen 
Suits: A Defense Perspective, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10162 (July 1986). Garret presumes 
that a polluter will continue polluting indefinitely if compliance will not exculpate it from liabil-
ity created by previous wrongs. Id. at 10162-63. No courts have accepted this argument, and 
with good reason. Any penalty assessed against one polluter may conceivably have a deterrent 
effect on other polluters who realize they too may be liable. The polluter who contemplates 
violating the statute for only a short time and then coming back into compliance will also be 
deterred if the polluter believes that such action will result in the assessment of a penalty. While 
a polluter would not be deterred from polluting if past liability were its only concern, the polluter 
would certainly want to avoid future liability. The 1987 amendments to the CWA authorize civil 
penalties of $25,000 per day of violation, supra note 10, so that continuing to pollute will cause 
the violator to incur greater and greater liability. Permitting suits for past violations makes the 
threat of sanctions much more effective as a deterrent. 
78. In addition, permitting citizen-plaintiffs to sue only for deterrent purposes again blurs the 
distinction between governmental and citizen enforcers discussed above in relation to the notice 
provision. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. This emphasis on injunctive relief 
applies only to suits brought by private parties. The EPA has made it clear that in governmental 
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The legislative history thus suggests that an appropriate standard 
must preserve the preeminence of injunctive action relative to deter-
rence-related actions without completely removing the availability of 
civil penalty assessments. Under a reasonableness standard, if the 
plaintiff has reason to believe injunctive relief is necessary when suit is 
filed, the court may grant civil penalties even if the violation is not 
ongoing and the injunctive relief is not granted.79 The statute's pri-
mary emphasis on abating illegal conduct and its secondary emphasis 
on punitive, deterrent actions are both preserved only when the rea-
sonableness standard is adopted. 
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS 
An examination of the general policy considerations implicated by 
the three alternative interpretations of section 505 strengthens the ar-
gument for the reasonableness standard. Application of either the 
ongoing violation or the "any past violation" standard will create con-
flicts within the CWA and seriously impair the ability of the statute to 
function adequately. 
A. The Impossibility of Effective Enforcement Under the Ongoing 
Violation Standard 
Arguments introduced by courts adopting the Chesapeake stan-
dard point up shortcomings in the functioning and logic of the 
Hamker approach. These arguments derive from the preliminary 
steps involved in bringing a citizen suit under the CWA. Every firm 
that wishes to discharge effluents into water must obtain a permit 
which limits the amounts and types of discharges allowed. 80 Every 
month, each source must file with the EPA detailed monitoring re-
ports that clearly indicate if and when a firm exceeds its permit limita-
tions. 81 The agency then reviews these reports and subsequently 
makes them available to the public. 82 While these reports provide 
very clear evidence of violations and are therefore of tremendous evi-
dentiary value, 83 there is nevertheless a substantial passage of time be-
enforcement suits, injunctive and penalty actions are equally important and should not be traded 
off against each other. EPA Policy Memorandum, supra note SS, at 2013. 
79. An actual granting of injunctive relief is at the judge's discretion. Miller II, supra note 9, 
at 10075; see Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 329. 
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), (b) (1982). 
81. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.21(f), 122.44(i) (1986). 
82. 33 u.s.c. § 1318(b) (1982). 
83. See Student Pub. Interest Res. Group ofN.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 
1485 (D.N.J. 198S); Fadil, supra note 15, at 37; Wall St. J., supra note 15 (the reports "showing 
discharges above permitted limits serve as a legal admission of guilt"). Additionally, such re· 
ports are easy to comprehend, as "[t]ypically they include on the same line both the permitted 
and the actual discharge levels of a pollutant. Laypeople can learn quickly how to read the 
reports .... " Fadil, supra note 15, at 37. Courts have routinely rejected the defenses of violators 
who attempt to escape liability by asserting that their own discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) 
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tween the actual improper discharge and its publication, 84 and, 
because of the notice provision, an even greater time lag between the 
violation and the first date upon which a concerned citizen is permit-
ted to bring suit. 85 A potential plaintiff simply cannot know in ad-
vance whether or not the violation found in the reports will be ongoing 
at the time suit is filed. 
In addition, effective, timely enforcement of the regulations, and 
thus control of pollution, is severely hampered where suits are author-
ized only for ongoing violations. 86 According to Hamker, a polluter 
violating pollution control standards or limitations before suit is 
brought could avoid citizen suit civil penalties by stopping the viola-
tion before the suit could actually be filed. 87 A source that has the 
financial ability to control its violations would nevertheless have no 
incentive, until threatened with suit, to spend money to cease 
violating. 88 
As a justification for adopting this flawed approach, the Hamker 
court placed great emphasis on the fear that allowing suits for past 
violations would lead to a drastic increase on the burden of federal 
courts. 89 The court worried that allowing citizens to sue for past 
are inaccurate or unreliable. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Res. Group ofN.J., Inc. v. Fritzche, 
Dodge & Olcott, 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (D.N.J. 1984). 
84. After a violation occurs, it is included as part of a discharger's monthly report of dis-
charges. This report is then submitted to the EPA, or, in the case of a violation of a permit 
issued under a State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES), to the state agency issu-
ing the permit. The data indicating that a violation occurred are formally made available to the 
public soon thereafter when the agency issues a report that contains all the information from the 
polluter's DMR. Because the citizen must wait for the filing of two reports before finding out 
about a violation, a citizen-plaintiff can commence an action no sooner than a month, and often 
substantially longer, after the actual violation occurs. Student Pub. Interest Res. Group ofN.J., 
Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (D.N.J. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1549 (E.D. Va. 1985). 
85. The notice provision requires an added 60-day delay before a suit may be filed. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 136S(b) (1982); see note 59 supra and accompanying text. 
86. "For penalties to serve as an effective inducement for compliance, they must be available 
for past as well as future violations." Miller II, supra note 9, at 10080; see Reisman, supra note 
19, at 10163; Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1475. 
87. Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985). Such a pol-
luter may still be enjoined, since a request for injunctive relief, according to established common 
law principles, is moot only when there is no reasonable likelihood the violation will recur. See 
note 33 supra and accompanying text. The fact that courts enforcing environmental statutes 
have seriously attempted to fashion equitable relief appropriate for the circumstances of each 
particular case, Miller II, supra note 9, at 10077, suggests that a court would be more likely to 
grant injunctive relief where it seems clear that a polluter is timing its compliance to coincide 
with enforcement suits thereby avoiding civil sanctions. 
88. See Reisman, supra note 19, at 10163. However, the possibility that a particularly bad 
polluter could become the subject of a government enforcement action for civil penalties limits 
the attractiveness of this strategy. Government enforcers are not limited, even under the 
Hamker approach, to prospective relief. See note 44 supra. Given the infrequency of agency 
enforcement actions, however, see notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text, only the most obvi-
ous and harmful polluters would have to consider seriously the threat of governmental enforce-
ment actions. 
89. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396. 
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wrongs would induce large numbers of plaintiffs with state-law envi-
ronmental damages claims to sue in federal court where attorney's fees 
are recoverable. 9o 
Although allowing suits for past violations might lead to some in-
crease in federal court activity, this increase would not be substantial. 
In most situations only a successful plaintiff may recover attorney's 
fees,91 and the court may force an unsuccessful plaintiff to pay the 
defendant's attorney's fees as well.92 Thus, no plaintiff is likely to risk 
bringing a suit in federal court when the federal-law claims are not 
sound. More significantly, the court-clogging scenario envisioned in 
Hamker depends upon the plaintiff's ability to bring state-law claims 
into federal court. However, because under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure the granting of pendent jurisdiction is at the court's discre-
tion,93 any federal court can avoid overcrowding by simply refusing to 
grant pendent jurisdiction. In practice, most courts dealing with the 
citizen suit issue have, in fact, allowed suits for past violations, but 
there has been no noticeable increase in the number of suits attempting 
to append state-law damages claims to federal causes of action under 
the CWA.94 
90. Hamker, 156 F.2d at 396. The recovery of attorney's fees is authorized by 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(d) (1982). 
91. See generally Miller III, supra note 11, at 10422. The district court of Delaware, how-
ever, suggested that in rare but appropriate situations even a losing party may recover attorney's 
fees. Delaware Citizens for Clean Air v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 62 F.R.D. 353, 355 (D. Del. 1974) 
(under analogous Clean Air Act). While arguing that "ultimate success in a citizen's suit was 
not intended to be a prerequisite to an award," 62 F.R.D. at 355, the court did acknowledge that 
a losing party should be allowed to recover attorney's fees only in those rare instances when the 
losing party's suit furthers the purposes of the CWA, or when "other exceptional circumstances 
tip the balance of the equities decidedly in the losing party's favor." 62 F.R.D. at 355. 
92. Congress worried about this court-clogging problem, but concluded that the threat of 
having to pay defendant's attorney's fees would "have the effect of discouraging abuse of [the 
citizen suit] provision, while at the same time encouraging the quality of the actions that will be 
brought." s. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 23, at 1499. See Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 329. 
93. "That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has 
consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's 
right." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Pendent jurisdiction is made 
possible by Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for consolidation of 
actions involving a common question of law or fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). 
94. The vast majority of citizen suits share three traits, suggesting that the level of judicial 
activity under the citizen suit provision is not a direct result of the availability of relief for past 
wrongs. In most recent cases, the plaintiffs have been environmental groups concerned primarily 
with protecting the environment as opposed to individuals seeking damages for injury. See 
Miller III, supra note 11, at 10425. No state law claims have been included, and most suits have 
included requests for injunctive relief as well as civil penalty relief. See, e.g., Chesapeake, 791 
F.2d at 304; Connecticut Fund for the Envt. v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 
1985); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enter., 618 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Atlantic 
States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (al-
lowing a suit based entirely upon past violations and no request for injunctive relief). 
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B. The Danger of Inconsistency Within the Statutory Scheme Under 
the ''Any Past Violation" Standard 
While an ongoing violation interpretation limits the effectiveness of 
enforcement under the CWA, there are also substantial problems with 
the "any past violation" approach. A major drawback to this stan-
dard is that citizen suits based solely on past violations look very simi-
lar to citizen suits for damages brought under state law. The Supreme 
Court has made it clear that Congress did not authorize a private right 
of action for damages under the CWA provisions.95 Although not en-
abling citizen-plaintiffs to recover money awards, the "any past viola-
tion" standard does permit plaintiffs seeking civil penalties to bring 
suits which bear a strong resemblance to private, state-law injury 
claims. In both situations, citizens sue polluters and force them to pay 
money because of some past, noncontinuing environmental wrong the 
defendant committed. 
Proponents of this Chesapeake "any past violation" interpretation 
argue that Congress, in denying private rights of action, meant only to 
keep plaintiffs with personal damages claims out of federal court, and 
not to restrict the scope of the CWA by permitting only suits based on 
continuing violations. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Association, 96 the Supreme Court focused pri-
marily on Congress' decision not to provide for a private right of 
action in the CWA.97 The Court considered the issue broadly, sug-
gesting that citizen suits based solely on past wrongs are generally in-
appropriate because section 505 "authorizes only prospective relief."98 
The Court saw the citizen's role as limited to situations in which a 
citizen suit has the potential to affect future behavior. 
This limitation supports the argument, suggested by analysis of the 
notice and preemption provisions,99 that civil suits based on past viola-
tions are incongruous with the purposes of section 505. Citizens were 
included in the enforcement provisions in order to encourage agency 
enforcement100 and, importantly, to help abate future violations of 
95. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clarnmers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 (1981); 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). See generally Glicksman, Federal Preemption 
and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121 (1985) (discussing private 
rights of action under a variety of environmental statutes). 
96. 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (fishermen denied recovery under CWA for damages caused by defend-
ant's past polluting). 
97. 453 U.S. at 14. 
98. 453 U.S. at 6. The Court did not provide any further indication as to which standard is 
most appropriate. Suits based solely on past violations clearly request more than prospective 
relief. While suits for ongoing violations do satisfy the court's construction of§ 505, the reasona-
bleness standard also limits plaintiffs to prospective relief, since jurisdiction under this standard 
is dependent upon the plaintiff's request for an injunction, which is a form of prospective relief. 
99. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. 
100. Village of Kaktovik v. Corps of Engineers, 12 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1740 (D. Alaska 
1978). See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 
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CWA regulations. IOI Rather than preventing future violations, a citi-
zen suit for penalties based solely on past violations, like a suit for 
damages, will merely force the defendant to pay money for past mis-
conduct. Such a payment bears no necessary relation to the likelihood 
that the defendant will violate in the future. The authority to sue for 
past violations should reside exclusively with the government, leaving 
citizens with the capacity to sue for civil penalties only as an adjunct 
to a request for forward-looking, injunctive relief. 102 
Another problem with the Chesapeake standard becomes evident 
when one considers the manner in which the settlement process and 
the governmental preemption provision work together. Under subsec-
tion 505(b)(l)(B), a citizen may not commence an enforcement action 
if the Administrator or a state is prosecuting an action against the 
alleged violator "in a court."103 While there is disagreement over the 
interpretation of this provision, most courts interpret the phrase "in a 
court" narrowly, I04 so that out-of-court enforcement actions taken by 
101. Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1093 (1st Cir. 1986); 
see notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text. 
102. While allowing suits based solely on past violations may thus be inappropriate, one 
commentator has further suggested that allowing citizens to sue for past violations is unconstitu-
tional. Lewis, Environmentalists' Authority to Sue Industry far Civil Penalties is Unconstitutional 
Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10101 (Apr. 1986). 
Lewis asserts that allowing citizens to sue for past violations amounts to granting citizens the 
power to enforce the law. Id. at 10104. He argues that, according to decisions such as Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which denies Congress the power to delegate executive authority, the 
grant to sue for past penalties is unconstitutional. Id. at 10101. The District of Maryland, how-
ever, explicitly rejected this argument in Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987). The court noted that the cases relied on by Lewis, and by the 
defendant in the Bethlehem case, addressed separation of powers between Congress and the Ex-
ecutive, not private persons and the Executive. 652 F. Supp. at 624. Additionally, the court held 
that Congress has wide latitude to determine who enforces the statutory rights that Congress 
creates. 652 F. Supp. at 625. This debate is not yet fully resolved, but it seems unlikely that any 
defendant will be able to avoid liability on a separation of powers argument. 
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (1982); see note 59 supra. 
104. Most courts have granted some agency actions preclusive effect, but have greatly limited 
the situations in which such actions wi!J be preemptive. Generally, courts look to see if the 
governmental enforcement actions provide roughly the same relief as a court order. See Baugh-
man v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (under a parallel preclusion provi-
sion in the CAA, agency actions have preclusive effect so long as the agency is capable of 
providing "meaningful and effective enforcement"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, adheres to the literal meaning of the preclusion provisions and suggests 
that no agency enforcement action is to be given preclusive effect. Friends of the Earth v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). Although it is unclear how many of the district 
court opinions remain good law after Consolidated Rail, a general test, focusing primarily on two 
factors, has evolved. Courts look to see whether agencies are capable of imposing the same range 
of penalty and injunctive relief as courts, see, e.g., Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. 
Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. Tenneco 
Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394 (D.N.J. 1985), and whether citizens are granted the same right 
to intervene as they would have in a court enforcement action, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. SCM 
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), affd., 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984); Student Pub. Inter-
est Res. Group ofN.J., Inc. v. Fritzche, Dodge & Olcott, 579 F. Supp. 1528 (D.N.J. 1984). But 
see Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F. Supp. 345 
(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (failure to grant citizens the right to intervene does not deprive an agency 
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governmental enforcers will not always bind subsequent citizen-
plaintiffs.105 
The nonbinding nature of consent agreements reached through 
out-of-court settlement negotiations takes on great significance when 
citizens are allowed to sue for one-time past violations. Consent agree-
ments almost always contain clauses in which a defendant promises to 
cease violating permanently.106 Although the most prevalent interpre-
tation of the preemption provision does not give preclusive effect to 
consent decrees reached between violators and agency enforcers, res 
judicata does prevent a citizen from suing for injunctive relief when 
the government has already brought and completed a suit designed to 
curb ongoing violations. 107 Where further injunctive relief is thus pre-
cluded, both the reasonableness and the ongoing violation standards 
would forbid citizen suits.108 
Courts applying the Chesapeake interpretation of section 505 have 
allowed citizen-plaintiffs to sue for civil penalties based on past viola-
tions if those violations were not expressly treated in a consent agree-
ment.109 Unless the defendant and agency enforcer reach an 
agreement that expressly covers all past violations, defendants will rec-
ognize that they cannot avoid all future suits by settling and will thus 
have a diminished incentive ever to settle out of court. Congress 
clearly hoped that citizen suits would trigger agency actions that do 
not require judicial involvement.110 The restrictive reading of the 
enforcement action of its preclusive effect), modified, 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). See generally 
Fadil, supra note 15, at 44-49; Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 345-48. 
105. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail, 768 F.2d 57; Fritzche, Dodge & Olcott, 579 F. Supp. 1528; 
SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828. 
106. See Miller II, supra note 9, at 10080-82 (most decrees in these actions have compliance 
schedules, setting a date beyond which the defendant agrees to cease violating). 
107. Under traditional common law rules, "a consent judgment normally is given full res 
judicata effect in the absence of a stipulation indicating that it is not on the entire claim." J. 
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.7, at 655 (1985) (footnote 
omitted). See Miller II, supra note 9, at 10081 ("Citizen suits ... cannot be maintained in the 
face of a completed judicial enforcement action for the same violations. This is true whether an 
enforcement action is concluded by a decree after full litigation or by consent decree."). 
108. At least one court has held, however, that while a consent order would normally pre-
clude citizen suits for injunctive relief, under the CAA, where only injunctive relief is allowed, 
such suits are allowed if the agency is not diligently enforcing the consent agreement. Gardeski, 
501 F. Supp. at 1166-67. See Miller II, supra note 9, at 10081 (subsequent actions are precluded 
"[ u ]nless there is an alleged failure of the plaintiff to enforce such a decree"). 
109. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Res. Group ofN.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 
1474 (D.N.J. 1985) (permitting citizens to sue where prior agency enforcement action was only 
forward looking); Love v. New York Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832, 844 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (permitting citizens to sue when the agency did not enforce "the environmental 
laws to the fullest extent possible"). If an ongoing violation or reasonableness standard were 
applied, the extensiveness of agency enforcement would not matter so long as it prohibited future 
violations, thus barring future requests for injunctive relief in the absence of a subsequent 
violation. 
llO. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979); Fadil, supra 
note 15, at 45-46; Note, Statute of Limitations, supra note 53, at 201. 
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agency preemption clause under the "any past violation" standard un-
dermines this goal by discouraging effective settlement of citizen suits. 
Finally, allowing suits for civil penalties based solely on past viola-
tions may conceivably be unconstitutional. This constitutional chal-
lenge centers on whether Congress was acting within the scope of its 
powers when granting citizens the right to sue for past violations. 
Congress gave citizens standing to sue under section 505 so long as 
they meet the standard set forth in Sierra Club v. Morton, 111 which 
makes clear that every plaintiff, whether an individual citizen or an 
environmental group, must show an "injury in fact." 112 A sufficient 
injury may consist of an adversely affected interest in a general envi-
ronmental good, such as clean water or unpolluted air. 113 However, in 
cases further delineating the scope of constitutional standing, the 
Supreme Court has held that in order to have standing a plaintiff must 
seek relief that will redress a specific injury .114 If the Sierra Club test 
is modified, as some commentators argue it must be, 115 the question 
arises as to whether penalties paid directly to the U.S. Treasury really 
redress any injury suffered by the plaintiff. While courts have almost 
uniformly agreed that any violation of a permit does establish a viola-
tion, 116 it is difficult to see how forcing a past violator to pay fines to 
the Treasury provides the citizen-plaintiff any form of redress. 
C. The Elimination of Problems and the Effective Functioning of 
the Clean Water Act Under the Reasonableness Standard 
Pointing to the problems associated with other standards and not-
ing that the ongoing violation and "any past violation" standards do 
have serious flaws is only meaningful if a more workable alternative 
111. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see note 17 supra. 
112. 405 U.S. at 733. 
113. 405 U.S. at 734; W. RODGERS, supra note 8, at 77; Senate Consideration of the Report 
of the Conference Committee, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 221. 
114. "[A]rticle III [of the Constitution] demands that a litigant have suffered some actual 
injury which may be redressed by a favorable judicial ruling." Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, 
at 332; see Simon v. East Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (plaintiff has standing 
only ifhe "has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision"). 
115. Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 333. 
116. Courts' inquiries have focused almost exclusively on questions relating to whose interest 
is at stake and to whether that interest has been injured. Courts have also tended to hold that 
every violation of an environmental statute results in an actionable injury. Courts usually will 
grant relief so long as a plaintiff shows she has an interest at stake and a violation has occurred. 
This completely ignores the question of whether a court action can redress the injury complained 
of. See Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 6, at 338-41. This issue was raised and rejected once in 
a lower court proceeding, Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 
617 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (D.N.J. 1985), but it has not been conclusively decided. The court 
found that suits based solely on past violations may provide benefit to the plaintiff at bar by 
deterring the defendant from polluting again. Additionally, such a penalty could deter others, 
thereby facilitating a system of economic incentives. 617 F. Supp. at 1200-02. "[I]t is consistent 
with Congress' intent to allow plaintiffs in citizen suits to redress their injuries by seeking relief in 
the form of general deterrence." 617 F. Supp. at 1201. 
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can be discovered. Under the CWA, a reasonableness standard avoids 
most of the policy problems associated with the Chesapeake and 
Hamker approaches, thus more closely serving the purposes intended 
by Congress. 
By linking every request for civil penalties with a reasonable plea 
for injunctive relief, the Pawtuxet approach is forward-looking, operat-
ing to abate continuing violations, including intermittent and sporadic 
violations, while yet deterring potential future violators. The reasona-
bleness standard ensures that plaintiffs will bring suits that are primar-
ily remedial rather than punitive. At the same time, the standard 
preserves the defendant's incentive to settle, because the citizen-plain-
tiff will not be able to meet the reasonableness requirement once a 
consent decree is concluded, and will therefore not be able to sue for 
civil penalties. 
Conversely, a reasonableness standard improves dramatically upon 
an ongoing violation standard by permitting a plaintiff to sue for civil 
penalties so long as there is reason to believe injunctive relief is neces-
sary at the time of filing. Application of the reasonableness standard 
would eliminate the uncertainty caused by delay between occurrence 
and publication of violations, while enabling the CWA to reach those 
polluters who may strategically and temporarily halt improper dis-
charges after receiving notice of a threatened suit. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The First Circuit's interpretation of section 505 best serves both 
the purposes and the policies behind the CWA legislation. Congress 
attempted to establish a meaningful distinction between the enforce-
ment powers of federal and state agencies on the one hand and the 
powers of citizen-plaintiffs on the other. A reasonableness standard 
preserves such a distinction by allowing the government to sue to en-
force discharge permits or to penalize polluters for past or current vio-
lations of effiuent standards, while permitting citizens to sue under 
section 505 only when a violator poses an immediate or chronic threat. 
The requirement in subsection 505(b) that citizens who intend to sue 
first notify the federal and state governments encourages agency inter-
vention. Under a reasonableness approach, the agencies will have an 
additional incentive to intervene, as early intervention may lead to a 
settlement, obviating the need for litigation. 
Ultimately, the primary reason for preferring the Pawtuxet reason-
ableness standard is also the most basic. Citizen-plaintiffs under the 
CWA, as under its predecessor the CAA, should be concerned primar-
ily with inducing compliance. Suits based exclusively on past viola-
tions should not be permitted. Unlike section 304 of the CAA, 
however, section 505 of the code does contain a provision authorizing 
citizens to sue for civil penalties. The citizen must have a meaningful 
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ability to request penalty assessments under section 505, but the 
Hamker ongoing violation standard makes penalty assessments virtu-
ally unobtainable. Only under a Pawtuxet approach will the citizen 
focus primarily on inducing compliance while nevertheless retaining 
the authority to request significant civil penalties. 
- James L. Thompson 
